Planners, officials, and neighborhood groups often debate zoning changes, yet there is little empirical evidence explaining why zoning and other land use regulations are changed. I use logistic regression models to examine density-enabling rezoning ("upzoning") in Los Angeles. I find that upzoning occurs where there are development opportunities combined with limited political resistance. Upzoning is most likely on well-located parcels zoned for low-intensity, nonresidential uses. Meanwhile, homeowners -and particularly homeowners with access to valuable amenities -are associated with regulatory stasis. I conclude by recommending strategies for addressing homeowners' concerns about higher density housing. 
Introduction
Urban economists and planners have made strong arguments for easing residential density limits based on housing price (Fischel 2005a; Glaeser and Gyourko 2002) , environmental (Calthorpe and Fulton 2001) , equity (Pendall 2000) , and consumer choice (Levine 2006) rationales. "Upzoning" is a common colloquial term used to describe land use regulatory changes that allow higher development intensity. While planners, politicians, and neighborhood groups often discuss upzoning, its actual occurrence is more rare. New York City, during a period of "rapid" rezoning activity, upzoned about 5% of its lots between and 2009 (Been, Madar, and McDonnell 2014 . Los Angeles, by contrast, upzoned about 1.1% of its land area between 2002 and 2014 (Gabbe 2016) . This paper uses the case of Los Angeles to extend our limited empirical understanding of the determinants of municipal zoning change.
I conceptualize the upzoning of a specific parcel to be a function of housing demand factors, existing supply constraints, the influence of interest groups, local demographic and economic factors, neighborhood trends, and municipal policy drivers. I first create a parcel dataset with Los Angeles regulatory, site, and neighborhood characteristics between 2002 and 2014. I then specify logistic regression models to analyze the relationship between parcel upzoning and the potential determinants mentioned above.
I find that upzoning follows the path of development opportunity combined with least political resistance, and there is strong evidence of homeowners' influence. Specifically, upzoning is least likely in areas with concentrations of homeowners coupled with desirable amenities like proximity to the beach and high-performing schools. Upzoning is most likely for parcels zoned for low-intensity land uses, and in neighborhoods with rising rents. All else equal, there are no significant associations between demographic variables and upzoning.
The determinants of zoning changes
Zoning codes emerged in the early twentieth century to separate single-family residences from industrial land uses, commercial areas, and apartments (Fischel 2004; Hirt 2007) . Today, zoning codes typically prescribe what land uses are allowed by-right and as conditional uses, and the maximum development densities that are permitted (Hirt 2007; Hoch, Dalton, and So 2000) .
Changes to the zoning designation of a property must be approved by the municipal government, and can be initiated by either a property owner or the local government (Hoch, Dalton, and So 2000) . Below I assess what we know about the determinants of zoning change.
Accessibility, amenities, and supply constraints
Demand and supply factors drive how much housing is built and where. Housing demand within a metropolitan area is influenced by natural amenities and human-created locational advantages (Anas, Arnott, and Small 1998; DiPasquale and Wheaton 1996) . Examples of natural amenities include proximity to the ocean or a location with a view. Human-created locational advantages include accessibility to employment and cultural amenities (DiPasquale and Wheaton 1996) .
Supply constraints may be natural or human-made (Saiz 2010) . Natural features that constrain housing supply include water bodies, mountains, and wetlands (DiPasquale and Wheaton 1996; Saiz 2010) . Some natural constraints may also have an amenity effect, if a parcel on a steep slope (a constraint) also has a view (an amenity). Land use regulations constrain housing supply by limiting locations and densities of new development, adding standards for lots and buildings, and shifting costs from a municipality to a developer (Deakin 1989) . Lot size can also be a constraint since small lots -particularly lots smaller than 5,000 square feet -are more difficult to develop or redevelop (Landis et al. 2006) .
Interest groups
Regulation is a product of competing interests seeking to rationally forward their selfinterest, and this competition plays out through the political process (Posner 1974; Stigler 1971) .
A handful of powerful interests are most active in proposing and influencing land use decisions, particularly the real estate development industry (Babcock 1966; Fischel 2005a; Logan and Molotch 1987; Molotch 1976; Stigler 1971; Warner and Molotch 2000) , business associations (Cooper, Nownes, and Roberts 2005; Heberlig, Leland, and Read 2014) , neighborhood organizations (Babcock 1966; Fischel 2005a; Frieden 1979; Warner and Molotch 2000) , and environmental groups (Frieden 1979; Fulton 2001) . Interest groups use votes and/or campaign contributions to influence politicians (Downs 1957; Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks 2005; Logan and Molotch 1987; Purcell 2000; Schone, Koch, and Baumont 2011) . Homeowners, environmental groups, and owners of developed land are generalized as opposing growth, while owners of vacant land and the real estate development industry are viewed as pro-growth.
Scholars have operationalized competition between interest groups over land use and development in different ways. These have included vacant landowners versus neighboring owners of developed land (Hilber and Robert-Nicoud 2013) ; homeowners versus developers (Been, Madar, and McDonnell 2014) ; the median voter and farmers versus developers (Chanel, Delattre, and Napoléone 2014); homeowners and environmental groups versus developers (Hawkins 2014) ; and voters versus non-voting interest groups (Schone, Koch, and Baumont 2011) . All of the studies above, with the exception of Been et al. (2014) , took a cross-sectional view of zoning and development.
Homeowners and neighborhood associations are powerful interests in most cities, with an apparent economic rationale for opposing upzoning. Fischel (2004) argued that exclusionary regulations represent the "dominance of home-owners and their touchiness about their main asset" (p. 317). Existing homeowners have an incentive to protect the value of their homes, and they do not internalize the price increases for renters or future residents (Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks 2005) . A home's value can be "reduced by changes in nearby land use, increases in neighborhood traffic, increases in local taxes, and decreases in the local school's test scores" (Fischel 2005b, 400) . Thus, the tendency for homeowners to become involved in local land uses issues. Although Fischel (Fischel 2005b; Fischel 2005a ) mainly focused on suburban homeowners, scholars have applied his model to test homeowner influence in big cities like New York City and Los Angeles (Been, Madar, and McDonnell 2014; A. H. Whittemore 2012) .
There has been little research on the determinants of zoning change. In the most relevant research on this topic, Been et al. (2014) assessed four aspects of the "growth machine" and "homevoter" theories in New York City: the presence and quality of public services, including schools, parks and transit; neighborhood market growth; neighborhood demographics, and voter turnout. The growth machine motivations were measured in terms of accessibility and amenities variables, while the homevoter motivations were measured in terms of homeownership rates. The authors used multinomial logistic regression models and found that neighborhood homeownership rates were associated with a higher probability of a parcel being downzoned and a lower probability of a parcel being upzoned. However, other relationships, including those related to city infrastructure capacity, were more ambiguous.
Neighborhood change, gentrification, and zoning
Neighborhoods change over time as a "result of past and current flows of households and resources-financial, social-psychological and time […] " (Galster 2001 (Galster , 2121 . Some neighborhoods experience periods of decline with others go through ascent or gentrification (Zuk et al. 2015) . There are several reasons to expect links between neighborhood changes and zoning decisions. Neighborhoods in the midst of demographic shifts and/or investments in the built environment could be more likely to be subsequently upzoned, particularly if they align with housing demand drivers. Meanwhile, zoning changes that encourage large new developments may then accelerate the pace of neighborhood change. To measure gentrification, scholars have focused on housing prices, indicators of neighborhood investment or disinvestment, changes in the share of renters, socioeconomic and demographic changes, and measures of neighborhood investment potential (Zuk et al. 2015) .
Race and economic status may influence the zoning changes that are proposed for a neighborhood, and local residents' abilities to repel or shape these changes. That is, low-income communities and community of color may have less power to influence zoning outcomes (Dubin 1992) . Relatedly, Rabin (1990) proposes the concept of "expulsive zoning," meaning that cities are more likely to adopt incompatible zoning changes (e.g., rezone to allow non-residential uses near housing) in black neighborhoods, and these changes ultimately undermine the stability of local communities.
Fiscal and environmental policy motivations
Large central cities' motivations for adopting more permissive zoning requirements might include mitigating negative externalities from growth, increasing tax revenue, and reducing public service costs. Proponents of upzoning in transit-accessible areas argue that residential infill development will result in higher public transit ridership, less road congestion, better air quality, and fewer greenhouse gas emissions (Cervero 2004; Landis et al. 2006) . This is the basis for California's statewide climate change mitigation policies focused on increasing residential densities near frequent-service public transit (Barbour and Deakin 2012) .
Municipal land use decision-making intended to generate property and/or sales tax revenues in excess of service costs has been characterized as the "fiscalization of land use" (Misczynski 1986; Wassmer 2002; Lewis 2001) . This has been particularly prominent in California, as 1978 voter-approved property tax limitations have increased municipalities' reliance on sales tax revenue (Lewis 2001; Schwartz 1997) . It is unclear if residential density is the connection between urban form and public service costs. Some scholars have found higher densities to be associated with lower per capita costs for some services (Carruthers and Úlfarsson 2008; Carruthers and Ulfarsson 2003) , while others have found positive or non-linear relationships (Ladd 1992; Ladd 1994) .
Los Angeles as a case study
Planners and economists have gravitated toward studying land use regulations in California because of the state's size, growth rates, degree of metropolitan fragmentation, variety of regulations, and general regulatory restrictiveness. I study Los Angeles, California -the most populous city in America's most populous state -to contribute to our limited understanding of intra-city zoning variation, and to add to the small quantitative evidence base related to zoning and zoning changes.
Los Angeles has nearly 3.9 million residents spread across 469 square miles ( Regulatory Index, found the city of Los Angeles to be more than two standard deviations above the national mean on a measure of local political pressure related to development (Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers 2008) . This is consistent with other municipalities in California, where strong local control of zoning represents "the most extreme example of autarky in land-use regulations of any U.S. state" (Quigley and Raphael 2005, 323) . In California -unlike many statesrezonings and general plan amendments tend to go hand-in-hand because state law requires most jurisdictions' zoning to be consistent with the adopted general plan (Governor's Office of 
Data
To analyze the determinants of municipal upzoning, I create a detailed dataset of site, regulatory, and neighborhood characteristics for the approximately 780,000 parcels located in the city of Los Angeles (Los Angeles County Assessor 2012). These data are summarized in Table   1 . Other planning and regulatory attributes include a location in an Adaptive Reuse Ordinance area, Historic Preservation Overlay Zone, and the age of each parcel's local community plan.
[Insert figure 1 here.] Census geographies (Logan, Xu, and Stults 2014) .
Infrastructure and public services
Infrastructure and public services variables relate to rail transit and bus rapid transit 
Other measures of accessibility, amenities, and natural features
Other data relate to employment density, job accessibility, proximity to the nearest freeway ramp, proximity to the ocean, elevation, and slope. Employment density is calculated [Insert Table 1 here.]
Methods
My conceptual model is that parcel upzoning is a function of housing demand and supply factors, the influence of local homeowners, municipal fiscal policy goals, socioeconomic and demographic factors, and neighborhood housing trends. In general, demand factors and municipal policy objectives would be expected to lead to upzoning. Strong homeowner interests, in contrast, would most likely hinder upzoning proposals.
Logistic regression models
Logistic regression models are appropriate for analyzing relationships between a binary dependent variable and a set of covariates (Hosmer, Lemeshow, and Sturdivant 2013 
I specify separate models for parcels initially zoned for single-family housing ("SF" parcels) and those that were not ("non-SF" parcels). 3 I split these two types of parcels because the literature and Los Angeles-specific policies indicate different decision processes given strong single-family neighborhood protections in local policy.
Logistic regression results are commonly reported as the natural log of odds (Hosmer, Lemeshow, and Sturdivant 2013) . To aid in interpretation I report odds ratios. The odds ratios in this paper represent the odds of a parcel being upzoning compared with the odds of a parcel not being upzoned. Statistically significant values greater than one show that as the predictor variable increases, so do the odds of a parcel being upzoned. Values lower than one show that as a predictor increases, the odds of upzoning decrease.
Negative binomial regression model
Although this paper is focused on a binary upzoning outcome, as a robustness check I model the determinants of new residential development capacity added through upzoning. Here instead of a binary outcome, the dependent variable is a count of a parcel's additional residential development capacity from upzoning. I estimate that the city added zoning capacity for a maximum of 116,000 new units on the parcels that were upzoned (Gabbe 2016) . I mostly focus on the logit model results for two reasons. First, this paper is focused on what makes upzoned parcels different from other parcels. Second, the upzoned development capacity estimate does not take into account site-specific development limitations, so I view it as a rough approximation.
The most commonly used regression models for count data are Poisson and negative binomial (Hilbe 2014 
Addressing the endogeneity of zoning and housing markets
Endogeneity is a methodological issue in most of the literature on land use regulations and housing markets (Quigley and Rosenthal 2005) . At issue is the simultaneity of influences; neighborhood characteristics affect zoning, and zoning affects neighborhood characteristics (Pogodzinski and Sass 1994; Quigley and Rosenthal 2005) . I address endogeneity in two ways in both models. First, I incorporate a dependent variable that represents zoning change, rather than cross-sectional characteristic of zoning. Second, given that zoning decisions are related to existing land uses and demographics, I control for each parcel's baseline characteristics.
Results and discussion
Upzoning was relatively rare in Los Angeles, with about 1.1% of the city's land area upzoned in the twelve-year study period. Below, Table 2 Valley, and it was more difficult to predict where these would be located.
The parcels with the highest likelihood of being upzoned were near downtown or at the urban fringe, zoned for employment uses (e.g., industrial, warehousing, etc.), and in neighborhoods with rising rents. Upzoning was less likely in neighborhoods with higher shares of homeowners, nearer to the beach, and in neighborhoods with higher standardized test scores.
At the end of this section, I compare these results with the determinants of new housing capacity (the negative binomial model).
[Insert Table 2 here.]
Accessibility
There are no significant associations between freeway access, rail and BRT proximity or employment accessibility and the odds of a parcel being upzoned. In terms of transit -a high profile driver of planning -there are several other reasons why Los Angeles's increasing transitorientation is not indicated in the regression results. One is that the city's rail and BRT lines run through some areas that already had permissive zoning, including downtown Los Angeles.
Another is that some upzoning around stations was approved prior to 2002, such as the . Lastly, the Hollywood Community Plan -a major plan to densify near rail transit -was halted by a lawsuit and is currently being revised (Zahniser 2013) . It is reasonable to expect different results if this study was repeated in five or ten years.
Amenities
Parcels nearer to the beach and higher performing elementary schools are generally associated with lower odds of upzoning. For non-SF parcels, for every mile farther from the beach, the odds of a parcel being upzoned increase by 56%. For single-family parcels, there is no significant association. School performance is associated with lower odds of upzoning non-SF parcels. For every one hundred-point increase in neighborhood API score, the odds of a non-SF parcel being upzoned decrease by 11%. There is no significant association between school performance and single-family parcel upzoning.
In terms of open space, there is no significant association citywide between proximity to a park and upzoning. General park proximity may be so common that it is not a major driver of demand. Over 80% of parcels in the city are within a half-mile of a moderately sized park.
Lastly, there are no significant associations between elevation and upzoning.
Steep slopes
There is no significant association between steep slopes and upzoning for non-SF parcels.
However, somewhat surprisingly, single-family parcels on steep slopes have nearly three times higher odds of being upzoned. This may be because 25% slopes may not represent a major development constraint; steep slopes may represent a view, which drives demand and increases the likelihood of upzoning; and/or single-family sites with steep slopes may have been historically overlooked and are now being viewed as a building opportunity.
Regulations and lot characteristics
A handful of pre-existing regulatory characteristics affect whether a parcel was upzoned.
First, historic preservation overlay zones (HPOZ) effectively stop zoning changes. A non-SF parcel located in a HPOZ is associated with 96% lower odds of upzoning. There were only about a dozen such HPOZ parcels modestly upzoned between residential categories. There were no single-family parcels in HPOZs upzoned between 2002 and 2014.
Zoning designations in place in 2002 affect subsequent upzoning. Overall, lowerintensity parcels are more likely to be upzoned than higher intensity ones. Parcels zoned for parking, manufacturing, and agricultural uses are much more likely to be upzoned than multifamily or commercial zoned parcels. Relatedly, parcels where allowable densities exceed 100 dwelling units per acre are unlikely to be further upzoned, demonstrating the ceiling to the city's baseline allowable density. Additionally, there is no significant relationship between a parcel being located in an adaptive reuse ordinance (ARO) area and being upzoned. These areas already tend to have permissive density allowances, which limits the extent to which there is further upzoning.
Lastly, I analyze the relationship between community plan updates and zoning decisions.
Community plans are the city's district-level plans to implement the citywide general plan (City of Los Angeles 2015a). For non-SF parcels, for every year since a community plan was last updated, there are about 16% lower odds of a parcel being upzoned. This supports the idea that zoning is an implementation tool of planning, and upzoning is more likely with prior planning.
There is no significant association between plan age and upzoning in single-family neighborhoods. Lastly, I looked at lot size. For non-SF parcels, there is no significant relationship between lot size and the likelihood of upzoning a parcel. One reason is that largescale city-initiated upzonings, like specific plans, include parcels of a variety of sizes. For SF parcels, there is a small positive relationship between parcel size and upzoning. This shows that larger parcels, including agricultural parcels, are more likely to be rezoned than smaller singlefamily lots.
Homeowner interests
The results from both models support the homevoter hypothesis. A parcel in a neighborhood with a higher share of homeowners is much less likely to be upzoned. This holds true for both non-SF and single-family parcels, and is the most consistent result across both sets of models. For non-SF parcels, the odds of upzoning in an area with a medium homeownership share (middle two quartiles) are about 82% lower than one in a neighborhood with a low homeownership share (bottom quartile). The odds of upzoning a non-SF parcel in a high ownership neighborhood (top quartile) are about 96% lower than in a low ownership neighborhood. For single-family parcels, the odds lower by 82% and 93% respectively.
Population and employment density
There were mixed results in terms of population density and upzoning. Non-SF parcels in neighborhoods with higher population density were more likely to be upzoned. This illustrates development pressures in urbanized areas. Meanwhile, SF parcels in lower density areas are more likely to be upzoned. This is reasonable since many of the upzoned single-family parcels were originally zoned for agricultural uses, and located at the edge of the city. Citywide, there are no significant associations between employment density and the odds of upzoning a parcel.
Neighborhood demographic and socioeconomic factors
I include measures of median household income, black population share, and Hispanic population share. I find no significant relationships between these variables and the odds of upzoning. From the descriptive statistics we might expect there to be differences for black and Hispanic neighborhoods. For example, 22% of parcels are in neighborhoods with more than 7% black population share (neighborhoods in the top quartile), while 16% of upzoned parcels were in these neighborhoods. However, after controlling for other factors, these differences were not statistically significant. Further research is certainly needed to better understand how communities of color influence, and are influenced by, zoning changes. In particular, it would be important to focus on neighborhoods with the largest and/or fastest-changing shares of residents who are black or Hispanic. However, non-SF parcels in neighborhoods with faster-rising rents are more likely to be upzoned. For every one hundred dollars that a tract's median rent increases between 1990 and 2000 (in nominal dollars), the odds of a non-SF parcel being upzoned increase by 74%. This illustrates real estate developer interests in the rezoning process. However, on single-family parcels, rising rents decrease the likelihood of a parcel being upzoned; for every one hundred dollar increase, the odds decrease by about 27%. This is because upzoned SF parcels are mostly located in the suburban San Fernando Valley, where the rental market was weaker. A useful future extension of this research would examine what was built on these parcels (if anything) after the upzonings were approved.
Neighborhood change
I
Comparing the determinants of upzoning and new development capacity
Although the focus of this paper is explaining why some lots are upzoned rather than others, as a robustness check I examine the determinants of new residential development capacity. The results are largely similar (table not shown). Consistent with the logit upzoning model, Los Angeles's new residential capacity is likely to be further from the beach, in neighborhoods with lower school test scores, on sites that did not previously allow residential development, in areas with newer community plans, and in neighborhoods with fewer homeowners.
There are three main differences. First, the city is more likely to add new development capacity by upzoning parcels nearer to freeways. This highlights the continued value placed on auto accessibility in Los Angeles. Second, capacity is more likely to be added in lower elevation areas, which are the most urbanized parts of the city. Third, this model shows no significant relationship between the degree of upzoning and rising rents in the 1990-2000 period. One explanation is that some of the biggest upzonings were initiated by the city through specific plans, and these initiatives were based less on market factors than on other policy priorities.
Overall, despite these differences, both sets of modeling results suggest the same basic story about upzoning.
Opportunities for future research
The limitations of this study suggest opportunities for future scholarship. First, future research would ideally assess three possible zoning outcomes: no zoning change, upzoning approved, and upzoning denied.
That is, we could analyze the characteristics of unsuccessful upzoning proposals; unfortunately zone change denial data are not available in a systematic form for Los Angeles. As a result, this paper may underestimate the influence of the determinants by essentially combining parcels with no zoning change and upzoning denied. This is probably a minor issue in this case. Anecdotally, from talking with several local planners and developers, I
learned that developers in Los Angeles try to avoid entering unpredictable discretionary processes, including proposing zoning changes that they think are likely to be denied. This points to another gap for future research: better understanding how developers' prior knowledge of what is likely to be approved influences their decisions about whether to propose an upzoning in the first place.
Conclusions and policy implications
This research finds that homeowners -and especially those with access to valuable amenities -are associated with regulatory stasis. The current political dynamic in Los Angeles, and undoubtedly many other American cities, is one in which the most desirable areas are also the most difficult to upzone. This presents a major barrier to using infill development to focus urban growth, as envisioned by local, regional, and state policymakers.
We need to better understand why and how some urban interests oppose growth. For instance, if a small vocal minority of homeowners can successfully fight zoning change, it is entirely possible for neighborhoods with moderate or low homeownership rates to successfully oppose growth. Additionally, there may be opposition from commercial property owners or other stakeholders. A good example is Hollywood, where a small group of litigious local property owners has fought zoning change and new development.
My findings suggest that there is some relatively "low hanging fruit" for rezonings and new development. Upzoning is most likely on sites with lower-intensity land uses, like parking, agriculture, and manufacturing. This is consistent with basic economic theory about the transition of land uses to the highest and best use in a growing city. Upzoning these types of parcels usually represents a sizable increase in allowable density. Parking, agriculture, and manufacturing parcels also tend to be located nearer fewer residents (and homeowners). This helps explain how upzoning takes the path of least resistance in terms of proximity to existing residents. But, this could be problematic over the long-term, because there is a limited supply of such land in higher-demand locations, and redevelopment for residential uses may have adverse impacts on local employment.
To overcome conflicts over zoning, planners will need to tailor neighborhood and citywide solutions to increase density. If local residents are concerned about protecting their access to amenities and existing neighborhood character, planners can partially mitigate these concerns through clearly written and predictably applied urban design standards, and linking new development with public improvements. Additionally, some consistent citywide policy changes may be more politically feasible than piecemeal neighborhood-scale policy changes. For example, the city could systematically reduce minimum parking standards near transit stations (rather than selectively in certain station areas). Lastly, when restrictive regulations hinder regional housing needs -particularly near transit -state intervention to allow higher densities should be a last resort. In short, upzoning will take a nuanced approach at the neighborhood and citywide scales. Note: for SF model, missing variables predict the results perfectly or were perfectly collinear.
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